Two weeks ago, George W. Bush called an international meeting for this Fall to negotiate a “political horizon” for the Palestinians. The date for the meeting is not yet set; the place is not yet determined; no invitations have yet been issued; no one knows who will eventually show up; no agenda has yet been set. But peace is at hand, if you believe Shimon Peres, in remarks with Condoleezza Rice in
I do believe that the Secretary was able to lead a policy that makes us nearer, more than ever before, to the conclusive chapter of the negotiations with the Palestinians.
Earlier in the day, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Saud al Faysal, in remarks with Condoleezza Rice, described the “conclusive chapter” a little differently:
The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques (King Abdullah) has stressed the importance of solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which could solve several tensions in the region. The Arabs have expressed their desire to arrive at a solution to the conflict and discuss the final solution directly.
The “final solution” in the Saudi Plan involves a complete Israeli withdrawal to its 1967 lines (including all of the Golan Heights and all of East Jerusalem), resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem “in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194” (code words for the “right of return”), a “sovereign independent Palestinian state” (meaning an armed government) on the vacated land, and East Jerusalem as its capital. Caroline Glick summarized it better here.
Meanwhile, the Roadmap has been effectively dumped. Condoleezza Rice has been peddling the idea that one can first negotiate the terms of a peace agreement (Phase III), and then circle back and condition its implementation on dismantlement of terrorist infrastructure (Phase I). But this is not just backwards, but impossible -- for reasons Evelyn Gordon summarized in “It’s Back to the Old ‘Political Horizon’ Scam:”
Israel cannot seriously negotiate final-status issues without knowing whether a Palestinian state will be serious about fighting terror, because that will determine how much Israel can safely concede. Given the PA's current record, for instance, no Israeli government would allow a Palestinian state within rocket range of
Ben-Gurion Airport or major cities such as Tel Aviv, meaning that Israel would have to keep territory even beyond the current route of the security fence. . . . Nor could any responsible government allow the West Bank to become the armed fortress that
Gaza has since the disengagement, when the PA took over the border with Egypt, under EU supervision. Absent evidence that a Palestinian state would take counterterrorism seriously, Israel would therefore have to retain control of the Palestinian- Jordanian border. . . . Moreover, no Israeli concessions are ever deemed enough. Israel's offers at the Camp David, Washington and Taba talks in 2000-2001, for instance -- a Palestinian state on some 97 percent of the territories, including most of east Jerusalem and the Temple Mount -- were not considered a sufficient "political horizon" to justify demanding Palestinian action on terror. The disengagement, in which
Israel demonstrated its willingness to uproot settlements for peace by destroying 21 communities in Gaza and four in the West Bank, was also not considered sufficient to mandate Palestinian action on terror. What this track record proves is that if
Israel signed a final-status agreement and the Palestinians still failed to deliver on terror, it would nevertheless come under tremendous international pressure to keep its side of the bargain, just as has happened with every previous agreement since 1993. Either the international community would whitewash PA behavior and declare the Palestinians in compliance when they were not, as it did from 1993 to 2000, or it would argue, as it has since, that Israel must "strengthen" the PA by starting to implement the agreement -- i.e. making concrete territorial and security concessions -- before the PA can be expected to do its part. Any agreement signed without prior proof of Palestinian willingness and ability to fight terror would thus almost certainly end up forcing Israeli withdrawals that would leave
Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Ben-Gurion Airport as vulnerable to terrorist fire as Sderot is.
As we watch the Bush Administration throw away its signal accomplishment in the Middle East -- a Roadmap with specified seriatim steps formally endorsed by both Israel and the Palestinians and by the UN, EU and Russia -- and replace it with the “political horizon” scam, it will be wise to remember Ariel Sharon’s words, speaking at the Herzliya Conference on December 18, 2003:
The concept behind [the Roadmap] is that only security will lead to peace. And in that sequence. This is the essence of the Roadmap. The opposite perception, according to which the very signing of a peace agreement will produce security out of thin air, has already been tried in the past and failed miserably.
And such will be the fate of any other plan which promotes this concept. These plans deceive the public and create false hope. There will be no peace before the eradication of terror.
The irony is that, if they would simply dismantle their terrorist infrustructure, as they have repeatedly promised, they could have their state the next day. Assuming a second state is what they want.
The Palestinians promised to eradicate terror in the Oslo Agreement and then didn't. They promised to do it again by agreeing to the Roadmap and then didn't. They were given the chance a third time to do it in Gaza after a total disengagement and then didn't. The idea that they would observe any new "agreement" to do it is absurd.
The idea that they would observe any new "agreement" to do it is absurd.
But Condi knows, er thinks she knows, er believes deep in her heart that the Palestinians just want a better life. What a dismal dismal failure this dysfunctional team of Condi-Bush-Baker-Olmert-Livni-Peres make.
Posted by: J. Lichty | August 06, 2007 at 05:06 PM